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We empirically assess the magnitudes of sovereign indebtedness responses for a sample of 
123 Advanced and Emerging Market Economies, between 1980 and 2018, taking into account 
the changing characteristics of financial markets, notably the Global and Financial Crisis. Our 
results show that when the financial conditions are more stressful, for instance, higher yield 
spreads or a heightened degree of financial stress, fiscal authorities use more actively their 
primary balance to reduce sovereign indebtedness, which is not the case when financial 
market conditions are more benign. This is notably true for the case of Emerging Market 
Economies sovereigns, who most likely then struggle more to fund themselves. 
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After the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and in the context of important restrictions 
to the implementation of fiscal policies, notably in Advanced Economies (AE) and in some 
Emerging Market Economies (EME), the appraisal of how fiscal authorities adjust to financial 
developments is quite important.1 For instance, it is useful to assess whether the track record 
as been one of more active (less Ricardian) or more passive fiscal developments in several 
groups of homogenous economies, which can hint at the future expected reaction from the 
fiscal authorities.  
Moreover, it is true that the level of government indebtedness increased to record levels in 
the context of the GFC, linked (in a vicious cycle) notably to heightened financial stress in 
capital markets and to higher sovereign yield spreads demanded by potential investors due to 
uncertainty reasons. At the same time, the ensuing downgrading of sovereign ratings 
contributed to the increase in the difficulties of sovereigns’ access to capital markets. Global 
debt reached the record peak of US$164 trillion in 2016, equivalent to 225 percent of global 
GDP (IMF, 2018). The world is now 12 percent of GDP deeper in debt than the previous peak 
in 2009.  
The existing literature has estimated fiscal policy response functions notably in a cross-
country analysis setup. In this context, based on the economic rationale that governments care 
about fiscal sustainability issues, it is possible to envisage a simple fiscal reaction function in 
which the primary balance improves to counteract past increases in government debt (Bohn, 
2008; Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay, 2005; and Afonso, 2008). In addition, the existence 
of possible cross-section dependencies, notably given the economic and financial 
interlinkages in advanced (emerging market) economies, capital markets integration, common 
monetary policy for the euro area countries, has been scarcely addressed within this 
framework. 
Against this background, we empirically assess the magnitudes of sovereign indebtedness 
responses for sovereign indebtedness for a sample of 123 AE and EME, between 1980 and 
2018, taking into account the changing characteristics of the financial markets, notably the 
GFC. This analysis is then in the vein of the FTPL discussion, where fiscal policy may have a 
relevant role, at least as important as monetary policy, in determining the price level. 2 
 
_____________________________ 
1 Some researchers have examined financial sector and crisis-related determinants of sovereign bond spreads (se 
e.g. Ebner (2009) and Dailami, Masson, and Padou (2008)). 
2 See Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) and Woodford (1995). 
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2. Empirical Methodology 
We set up a sovereign debt reaction function (see Canzoneri et al., 2001; Afonso, 2008; 
and Bohn, 2008) to assess whether the primary budget balance negatively affects government 
liabilities. We can estimate the following relationship for country i and time t: 
 
                                        1 1it it it it itB s B z uγ ϕ β− −∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ .                                  (1)  
 
Equation (1) is compatible with the standard budget deficit and debt dynamics formulation, 
where government debt (B) changes due notably to the primary balance (s). When 0<γ , 
most likely the government uses budget surpluses to reduce outstanding government debt. In 
addition, the output gap (z) – the difference between the actual output and potential output 
(expressed as percentage of potential) – controls for the reaction of debt to the business cycle. 
uit is a standard white noise disturbance. The option of using first differences is to avoid 
potential stationarity issues, an approach followed for instance by Afonso (2008) and 
Canzoneri et al. (2001). 
We begin by estimating (1) with a pooled OLS estimator (augmented with country and 
time effects included to control, respectively, for all time-invariant differences across 
countries – such as geographical characteristics - and for global shocks - such as shifts in oil 
prices or the global business cycle). The first-differenced equation should take care of 
stationarity issues, however it introduces a correlation between the differenced lagged 
dependent variable and the differenced error term, hence, the use of instruments is required. 
Consistent estimates can be obtained employing a two-stage least squares (TSLS) estimator 
and relying on instrumental variables (IV) which are correlated with 1−∆ its ( 1−∆ itB ) and 
orthogonal to itv∆ ( itu∆ ). Indeed, lagged values 2−∆ its and 2−itB satisfy these assumptions and 
can be used as IV for the first-differenced equation (1). To address potential endogeneity 
concerns, we also rely on a system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995). For 
robustness purposes, other (more recent) estimators that are arguably preferable since they 
explicitly deal with cross-sectional dependencies, are also employed. First, we re-run (1) with 
a panel estimation allowing for Driscoll-Kraay (1998) robust standard errors. Then, we use 
the Mean Group (MG) estimator (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). In addition, we rely on the 
Common Correlated Effects Pooled estimator that accounts for the presence of unobserved 
common factors. In its heterogeneous version, the Common Correlated Effects Mean Group 
(CCEMG), the presence of unobserved common factors is achieved by construction and the 
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estimates are obtained as averages of the individual estimates (Pesaran, 2006). Yet another 
recent approach is due to Eberhardt and Teal (2010), termed Augmented Mean Group (AMG) 
estimator, and it accounts for cross-sectional dependence by including of a “common dynamic 
process”. 
As far as data is concerned, we use annual data for 123 countries over 39 years that is, 
focusing on the period 1980-2018. The fiscal data comes from the IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics database. In addition, we use the output gap to control for business cycle 
fluctuations. The fiscal data comes from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics database. 
Despite substantial progress in the estimation methodologies to calculate potential output, 
there is still not a widely accepted approach in the profession. Researchers adopt two 
alternative approaches to estimate potential GDP (Borio, 2013): i) there are univariate 
statistical approaches, which usually consist of filtering out the trend component from the 
cyclical one; ii) there are the structural approaches, which derive the estimates directly from 
the theoretical structure of a model. In the present paper, we opt for the first approach, that is, 
the output gap is computed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter (as standard practice in the 
literature).3  
As far as panel stationarity is concerned, results of first (Im-Pesaran-Shin, 1997) and 
second-generation (Pesaran, 2007) panel integration tests are available upon request for 
reasons of parsimony. Essentially, we can accept most conservatively that non-stationarity 
cannot be ruled out in the main variables of interest in levels.  
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
In Table 1 we report our baseline results. It is possible to see that, indeed, better fiscal 
positions (higher primary balances) translate into lower sovereign debt ratios. In addition, 
such reaction is statistically less significant after the GFC. This can be interpreted as a bigger 
part of the increase in sovereign debt being at that time probably more related to the so-called 
stock-flow adjustments. These in many cases stemmed from the materialization of contingent 
liabilities that countries had to absorb in their public accounts. In addition, it seems that the 
_____________________________ 
3 Alternatively we also employed the IMF’s WEO output gap which yielded qualitatively similar results, even at 
the cost of a smaller number of observations. In fact, the bivariate correlation between the common set of WEO 
and HP-generated output gaps was 85 percent in our sample. The reason why the WEO output gap was not used 
as the baseline relates to the fact that these estimates are problematic in a cross-country analysis as they are 
based on methodologies that vary by country desk. As such, differences in gap estimates across countries are 
also due to the different methodologies used, rather than differences in economic fundamentals.In addition, by 
applying a filter we maximize the total number of observations available in a consistent and uniform manner. 
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coefficient of changes of primary balances is larger (in absolute value) in the subsample of 




In Table 2 we account for financial conditions present in the markets and rely on the 
system GMM estimator (results using other estimators available upon request). Note that due 
to data availability constraints Tables 2 and 3 are estimated with data until 2014.4 In other 
words, we split the sample considering the cases above and below the subsample median (that 
is, either the subsample of AE or EME) of the Financial Stress Indicator (FSI) and of 
sovereign bond spreads vis-à-vis the USA.5 It is important to notice that when financial 
conditions are more stressful, governments more actively use primary balances to curb down 
sovereign indebtedness. This is notably true in the EMEs sub-sample, which is not the case 
when financial market conditions are more benign, where almost no statistically significant 
effect can be uncovered between the primary balance and the debt ratio. In the case of AEs, 





Moreover, the magnitude the response of debt to higher primary balances, in dire financial 
conditions, is also higher and more statistically significant in the cases of high spreads, for the 
EME and AE subsamples, which may imply that sovereigns struggle more to finance 
themselves in capital markets in those periods. Spreads are a measure of a country’s overall 
risk premium, stemming from market, credit, liquidity, and other risks. EMEs during times of 
hardship are typically characterized by a higher degree of uncertainty (relative to AEs) 
leading to higher prices demanded on their sovereigns. This finding is consistent with the 
view that crisis periods adversely affect the ability of sovereign issuers to service their debt, 
_____________________________ 
4 The FSI data are only available until 2014. We use the spreads data ending also in 2014 for comparability 
purposes. 
5 The FSI variable was retrieved from Balakrishnan et al. (2009) extended to 2014. This index represents an 
important improvement vis-à-vis zero-one binary variables, as it measures the intensity of stress and it is not 
ambiguous regarding ‘near-miss’ events. Moreover, it covers both abrupt rises in risk and uncertainty, concerns 
about the health of the financial sector, large swings in asset prices and sudden drops in liquidity.Bond yields 
come from Datastream and Bloomberg and the spread was computed vis-à-vis the US benchmark. 
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which is reflected in the premium on their bond yields.6 This conclusion is also valid for the 
case when the full country sample is used instead (see Table 3). 
Finally, we re-estimated the baseline analysis using alternative estimators as a robustness 
check. In addition, we also split the sample by geographical regions (Europe, Western 
Hemisphere, Africa, and Asia and Middle East) and the time span by decade.  
Table 4 summarises the signs (positive or negative) of the obtained estimated coefficients 
of the change in primary balances (and also whether the obtained coefficients were 
statistically significant). We get the confirmation of the estimated negative coefficient for the 
cases of Europe and Western Hemisphere., while there is no statistically supported reaction in 
the case of the African, and Asian and Middle Eastern country sub-samples. Moreover, we 
can observe that, while in the sub-period 2000-2010 there is a statistically significant effect of 
the primary balance in reducing sovereign indebtedness, that effect is no longer significant in 




4. Conclusions  
We assessed the magnitudes of sovereign indebtedness responses for sovereign 
indebtedness for a sample of AE and EME, between 1980 and 2018.  
We found that when the financial conditions are more stressful, for instance, higher yield 
spreads or higher financial stress, fiscal authorities use more actively the primary balance to 
reduce sovereign indebtedness, which is not the case when financial market conditions are 
more benign. This is notably true for the case of EMEs. 
Policy implications are twofold: i) adverse financial conditions put more pressure onto 
fiscal authorities that make an effort to keep their debts on track more actively; that is, 
stringent financial conditions act as a disciplinary mechanism; ii) after the 2008-10 GFC it 
seems plausible that other (key) factors, over and beyond that coming from budgetary 
imbalances, end up showing up in the stock of sovereign debt. 
 
_____________________________ 
6 Bellas et al. (2010) findings indicate that financial sector vulnerabilities appear to be a crucial factor in 
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Table 1. Baseline Results (1980-2018) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Estimator OLS IV GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Sample  all all all AE EME all all 
Time Spain all all all all all Before GFC After GFC 
L.change in debt 0.204*** 0.217*** 0.223*** 0.386*** 0.193** 0.219*** 0.238*** 
 (0.035) (0.041) (0.066) (0.088) (0.074) (0.070) (0.089) 
L.change in primary balance -0.091*** -0.094*** -0.027* -0.253** -0.028* -0.023** -0.107 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.113) (0.015) (0.009) (0.118) 
change in output gap -0.003* -0.004 -0.004** -0.179 -0.004* -0.003** -0.022 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.188) (0.002) (0.001) (0.021) 
        
Observations 2,799 2,675 2,799 943 1,853 1,851 1,894 
Number of countries 123 123 123 36 87 123 123 
R-squared 0.273 0.111      
Hansen P-value   0.56 0.71 0.87 0.42 0.72 
AR2 P-value   0.126 0.203 0.182 0.118 0.261 
AR1 P-value   0.012 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.008 
Note: “GFC” denotes Global Financial Crisis (corresponding to 2007/08). “L” denotes the lagged variable. 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the country level. The Hansen test evaluates the validity of the 
instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and AR(2) are the Arellano–Bond 
autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), respectively. Time and country 
fixed effects were included, but are not reported. Also, a constant term has been estimated but it is not reported 
for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.  
 
 
Table 2.  Accounting for financial conditions, AE vs EME (1980-2014) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Estimator GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Sample AE AE AE AE EME EME EME EME 
Criterion Low FSI High FSI Low Spreads High Spreads Low FSI High FSI Low Spreads High Spreads 
L.change in debt 0.361** 0.272*** 0.390*** 0.371*** 0.331** 0.174 -0.021 0.170 
 (0.167) (0.077) (0.098) (0.132) (0.119) (0.127) (0.127) (0.131) 
L.change in primary balance -0.222** -0.283** -0.134 -0.241*** -0.241 -0.441*** -0.464 -0.412*** 
 (0.083) (0.105) (0.101) (0.082) (0.478) (0.149) (0.425) (0.122) 
change in output gap -44.210* -12.582 -12.933 -6.693 -10.032 -1.474 -18.782 -1.151 
 (21.565) (12.374) (16.899) (18.121) (55.276) (15.907) (38.457) (15.816) 
         
Observations 287 529 397 419 136 632 130 638 
Number of countries 25 35 33 30 20 48 17 46 
Hansen P-value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AR2 P-value 0.76 0.99 0.13 0.25 0.76 0.18 0.11 0.60 
AR1 P-value 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.06 0.03 
Note: “L” denotes the lagged variable. Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the country level. The 
Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and 
AR(2) are the Arellano–Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), 
respectively. Time and country fixed effects were included, but are not reported. Also, a constant term has been 
estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significant at the 10, 5 and 




Table 3.  Accounting for financial conditions, whole sample (1980-2014) 
 
Specification  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimator GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Sample all all all all 
Criterion Low FSI High FSI Low Spreads High Spreads 
L.change in debt 0.412*** 0.154** 0.332*** 0.173** 
 (0.133) (0.063) (0.086) (0.072) 
L.change in primary balance -0.161* -0.390*** -0.172* -0.364*** 
 (0.091) (0.096) (0.085) (0.128) 
change in output gap -27.723 -7.151 -7.970 -5.702 
 (18.832) (11.611) (12.997) (12.385) 
     
Observations 390 1,365 414 948 
Number of countries 45 95 37 77 
Hansen P-value 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AR2 P-value 0.99 0.88 0.14 0.69 
AR1 P-value 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Note: “L” denotes the lagged variable. Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered at the country level. The 
Hansen test evaluates the validity of the instrument set, i.e., tests for over-identifying restrictions. AR(1) and 
AR(2) are the Arellano–Bond autocorrelation tests of first and second order (the null is no autocorrelation), 
respectively. Time and country fixed effects were included, but are not reported. Also, a constant term has been 
estimated but it is not reported for reasons of parsimony. *, **, *** denote statistical significant at the 10, 5 and 
1 percent level, respectively.  
 
 
Table 4. Robustness Checks and Sensitivity (1980-2018) 
 
Effect of change in debt on…     
     
Robustness Estimators Driscoll-
Kraay 
CCEMG MG AMG 
L.change in primary balance (controlling for change 
in output gap) 
-0.096*** -0.276*** -0.193*** -0.287*** 
     
Geographical Regions (with GMM) Europe Western 
Hemisphere 
Africa Asia and Middle 
East 
L.change in primary balance (controlling for change 
in output gap) 
-0.323*** -0.280* -0.034 -0.118 
     
Time split (with GMM) 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-
2010 
2010-2018 
L.change in primary balance (controlling for change 
in output gap) 
-0.256** -0.017** -0.185** -0.140 
Note: Estimation of (1). “L” denotes the lagged variable. For further details on the estimators refer to the main 
text. *, **, *** denote statistical significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
